我们说:美感就是愉快感。那么,愉快感就是美感吗?当然不是。
天气热,吃到冰淇淋,自是乐事。但这不是美感,因为这种愉快感是功利性的。这是感官快感。
别人有灾难,你帮了个大忙,对方感激涕零,亦是件大乐事。可是如果对方不领情,还对你破口大骂,你的感觉又如何呢?这其实是道德快感。
感官快感和道德快感的共同点是:由愉快产生判断。就是说,先把冰淇淋吃了才感觉好吃,帮了别人的忙后才感到心情舒畅。
审美愉快感刚好相反:由判断而产生愉快。就是说先看到了花,先认为它美才感觉到愉快,至于是不是毒花,那不是考虑的因素,因为审美是无功利性的。一样东西美不美,和它能不能给我带来好处和用处是没有关系的。
所以说情人眼里出西施,或者别人看到你的女朋友而惊为天人,是不是审美态度,那就难说了。当然,话说回来,找女朋友或未来太太,是不是要用审美的态度,那是个不同的话题了。
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Kant said: Aesthetic judgments are disinterested, meaning that we take pleasure in something because we judge it beautiful, rather than judging it beautiful because we find it pleasurable.
Interest is defined as a link to real desire and action, and thus also to a determining connection to the real existence of the object.
Certainly, I may wish to own the beautiful painting, or at least a copy of it, because I derive pleasure from it - but that pleasure, and thus that desire, is distinct from and parasitic upon the aesthetic judgment.
If there's a beautiful painting, or if there's a beautiful melody, you just want to enjoy it, you just want to absorb yourself in it, surrender yourself to it, you don't want to do anything with it, and you don't want to make use of it.
So in the same way, if you see a really beautiful woman, you just appreciated her as a beautiful woman, you wouldn't want to do anything with her, you'd just be quite happy gazing and gazing, appreciating her beauty.
But, needless to say, that's not our usual attitude, we don't usually see aesthetically, we see in terms of sensuous attractiveness hence craving springs up, or we see in terms of sensuous attractiveness because the craving is there, looking round, searching for an object.
Aesthetically speaking, it is the judgment that results in pleasure, rather than pleasure resulting in judgment.
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